

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 106075 TOSEC 040133
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY AF/S:WGBOWDLER:SBA

APPROVED BY THE ACTING SECRETARY

S/S- ORPERITO

AF:TWSEELYE

-----100508Z 107781 /10

O 100440Z MAY 77 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 106075 TOSEC 040133

NODIS

CHEROKEE, FOR SECRETARY FROM CHRISTOPHER

E.O. 11652:XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, SF

SUBJECT:CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA ON
YOUNG VISIT

1. SUMMARY. FOLLOWING OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION, I CALLED FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA AT 2:00 A.M. PRETORIA TIME TO RELAY OUR DEEP CONCERN OVER THEIR AIDE MEMOIRE AND TO ASK FOR A RECONSIDERATION OF THEIR DECISION IN ORDER TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OUR MUTUAL LONG TERM INTERESTS AS WELL AS PROBLEMS WITH THE HOLDING OF THE VIENNA MEETING. HE INDICATED HE WOULD TALK TO THE PRIME MINISTER FIRST THING IN THE MORNING, AND THAT HE WOULD BE MUCH HELPED BY MY SUGGESTION THAT THE VISIT COULD BE NARROWED IN TIME AND CONTENT. END SUMMARY.

2. AT THE OUTSET OF HIS RESPONSE, BOTHA SAID THAT HE
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WANTED TO BE CANDID ABOUT THE MAIN PROBLEM WITH THE VISIT. NEVER IN HIS EXPERIENCE HAD HE COME ACROSS THE PHENOMENON OF CONTINUED INSULTS AND DEROGATORY REMARKS FROM A HIGH OFFICIAL OF ANOTHER COUNTRY. IN THE PAST, THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE USG HAD ALWAYS OPPOSED SOUTH AFRICA POLICY, BUT IN A WAY THAT THEY COULD HANDLE. BOTHA NOTED THAT HE HAD GONE OUT OF HIS WAY

SINCE RETURNING TO HIS COUNTRY TO BE HELPFUL AND TO

FACILITATE FAVORABLE ACTION ON THE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS
OF SOUTHERN AFRICA.

3. I TOLD BOTHA THAT I VERY MUCH APPRECIATED HIS CANDOR. I INDICATED THAT WE HAD HIGH EXPECTATIONS FOR THE VIENNA MEETING BUT IF THE SAG ADHERED TO THE POSITION TAKEN IN ITS AIDE MEMOIRE IT WOULD PUT US IN A MOST DIFFICULT POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE HOLDING OF THOSE TALKS AS WELL AS PRESENTING A LONGER TERM PROBLEM.

4. BOTHA SAID THAT THEY WERE NOT TURNING DOWN THE YOUNG VISIT, BUT RATHER ASKING FOR ITS POSTPONEMENT. HE NOTED THAT IT CAME IN THE MIDST NOT ONLY OF THE VIENNA MEETING BUT ALSO A SERIES OF OTHER PLANS WHICH HE HAD INVOLVING THE BLS COUNTRIES. INCREASING IN HIS CANDOR, HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE ATMOSPHERE IN SOUTH AFRICA IS VERY BAD FOR AMBASSADOR YOUNG. THE BAD FEELING IS NOT RESTRICTED TO THE AFRIKANER COMMUNITY, BUT IS SHARED BY THE ENGLISH AS WELL. BOTHA WENT ON TO NOTE THAT HE WAS IMPRESSED BY HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER AND CAME BACK TO SOUTH AFRICA DETERMINED TO WORK FOR A SOLUTION OF THE RHODESIAN AND NAMIBIAN PROBLEMS. BUT THE "CONTINUED TORRENT OF INSULTS" MAKE IT ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH HE COULD GET APPROVAL FOR THE CHANGES IN ATTITUDE AND POLICY WHICH ARE REQUIRED.

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5. AT THIS POINT, I REFERRED TO HIS EARLIER STATEMENT REGARDING POSTPONEMENT, AND ASKED HIM ABOUT THE TIME FRAME HE HAD IN MIND. HE WAS HESITANT IN HIS REPLY, SAYING ONLY THAT IT IS HARD TO BE SPECIFIC AND THAT THE MONTH OF MAY IS BAD. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IF IT IS DIFFICULT FOR US TO GO AHEAD WITH THE VIENNA MEETING, IT COULD BE PUT ON ICE. I RESPONDED THAT WE WOULD NOT WISH TO DO THIS, CONSIDERING THAT THE TALKS COULD HAVE A VERY BENEFICIAL LONG TERM RESULT. I ASKED WHETHER LIMITING THE YOUNG VISIT TO A MEETING WITH BUSINESSMEN AND SEEING A FEW PEOPLE IN THE EMBASSY WOULD NOT BE A LESS DIFFICULT ALTERNATIVE FOR THEM.

6. BOTHA RESPONDED BY ASKING ME WHETHER WE WERE KEEPING TRACK OF WHAT YOUNG WAS SAYING ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA.

I TOLD HIM THAT YOUNG WAS NOT GOING TO SOUTH AFRICA FOR THE PURPOSE OF CAUSING DIFFICULTIES. YOUNG HAD MADE CLEAR TO US THAT HIS VISIT WOULD BE BRIEF AND WAS

WILLING TO LIMIT IT TO THE BUSINESSMEN'S DINNER AND THE MEETING WITH A FEW PEOPLE IN THE EMBASSY. HE NEVER INTENDED TO MAKE THE VISITS REPORTED IN THE PRESS.

7. BOTH A SAID THEY HAD IRREFUTABLE EVIDENCE THAT THE STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO YOUNG CAME FROM THE US MISSION IN NEW YORK. BOTH A CONTINUED THAT NOW WE WERE EXERTING PRESSURE ON THEM TO ALLOW THE VISIT. WHAT ARE WE TO THINK, BOTH A ASKED RHETORICALLY, IF WE MEET IN VIENNA AND THERE IS ANOTHER TORRENT OF STATEMENTS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. I HASTENED TO POINT OUT TO BOTH A THAT MY CALL WAS NOT INTENDED TO BE UNWARRANTED PRESSURE. I WAS TRYING TO REASON WITH HIM ON THE BASIS OF THE LONG TERM INTERESTS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. AGAIN, I ASKED HIM TO RECONSIDER TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE IMPLICATIONS IF THEY INSISTED ON THEIR POSITION IN THE AIDE MEMOIRE.

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THING IN THE MORNING AND GET IN TOUCH WITH ME TOMORROW BY TELEPHONE. CHRISTOPHER

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PAGE 01 STATE 106075
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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

66011
DRAFTED BY:SS:PTARNOFF
APPROVED BY:MR.TARNOFF
DESIRED DIST:S/S ONLY
-----112352Z 032822 /61

O 112146Z MAY 77 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 106075

NODIS
CHEROKEE FOR AMBASSADOR YOUNG ONLY FROM TARNOFF

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 106075 (TOSEC 040133), SENT ACTION
USDEL SECRETARY MAY 10TH.

QUOTE: C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 106075 TOSEC 040133

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THING IN THE MORNING AND GET IN TOUCH WITH ME TOMORROW BY TELEPHONE. CHRISTOPHER
UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptoning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TOSEC, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, AMBASSADORS, VISITS, AIDE MEMOIRE, GOVERNMENT REACTIONS, CAT-C, CHEROKEE
05/10/77
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Sent Date: 10-May-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: WGBOWDLER:SBA
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X3
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
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From: STATE
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Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
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Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
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Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2580074
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA ON YOUNG VISIT
TAGS: PFOR, OVIP, SF, (YOUNG, ANDREW), (BOTHA, PIK), (BOTHA, S P)
To: SECRETARY
Type: TE
vdkgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/31034597-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
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EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
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